Many animal species, from arthropods to apes, share food. This paper presents a new framework that categorizes nonkin food sharing according to two axes: (1) the interval between sharing and receiving the benefits of sharing, and (2) the currency units in which benefits accrue to the sharer (especially food versus nonfood). Sharers can obtain immediate benefits from increased foraging efficiency, predation avoidance, mate provisioning, or manipulative mutualism. Reciprocity, trade, status enhancement and group augmentation can delay benefits. When benefits are delayed or when food is exchanged for nonfood benefits, maintaining sharing can become more difficult because animals face discounting and currency conversion problems. Explanations that involve delayed or nonfood benefits may require specialized adaptations to account for timing and currency-exchange problems. The immediate, selfish fitness benefits that a sharer may gain through by-product or manipulative mutualism, however, apply to various foodsharing situations across many species and may provide a simpler, more general explanation of sharing. Sharing food appears to exemplify the paradox of altruism: a recipient gains fitness benefits at the expense of a donor. Despite this apparent altruism, food sharing commonly occurs in nonhuman animals, including insects (Bolten et al. 1983; Boggs 1995; Vahed 1998) (Kavanagh 1972; Strum 1975 Strum , 1981 Dittus 1984) and apes (Kuroda 1984; de Waal 1989; Nettelbeck 1998) . Many of these and other authors have used different definitions of food sharing. Here, we adopt a relatively broad definition of sharing: joint use of monopolizable food items. That is, if an individual can defend a food item but allows another individual to consume part of the item, it is considered to be sharing. This definition includes both passive (tolerated theft) and active sharing (facilitated transfer, food recruitment). Regardless of the method of transfer, the food owner loses potential fitness benefits by sharing.
Sharing poses an important economic problem in animal societies. Although apparently altruistic, sharing typically yields benefits to the food donor either indirectly through kin selection (Hamilton 1964) or directly through other mechanisms. Much of animal food sharing probably results from kin selection or parenteoffspring sharing (Feistner & McGrew 1989) . Because this type of sharing is well understood, we focus on nonkin explanations of sharing involving direct fitness benefits to the donor.
Fitness Benefits
Here we review nonkin sharing studies using a conceptual framework partially based on Brown's (1980) fitness components. We divide fitness benefits for nonkin sharing along two axes (Table 1) . Our first axis considers the time at which the donor receives its benefit: either immediately following sharing or after a delay. For example, a lioness, Panthera leo, that just captured a Thompson's gazelle, Gazella thomsonii, has two options when another pride member approaches: she can defend the carcass or allow the intruding lioness to feed with her. By sharing, the owner may benefit immediately by avoiding a contest,
